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Abstract
We show that organization structure of a stock exchange matters by utilizing the unique set-
ting prevailing in India. India has two major stock markets, the Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). These two exchanges adopt similar trading
systems, trade essentially identical stocks, and follow the same trading hours. However, these
exchanges have diﬀerent organizational structures: BSE is mutualized whereas NSE is demu-
tualized. Using the Hasbrouck [Review of Financial Studies 6 (1993) 191] measure of market
quality we show that NSE provides a better quality market than BSE. This result is consistent
with the work of Domowitz and Steil [Brookings–Wharton Papers on Financial Services,
1999], who proposed that demutualized exchanges are superior to mutualized in governance.
 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: G32; G34; G14; G15
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1. Introduction
In sharp contrast to the plethora of studies that examined the impact of corpo-
rate governance provisions adopted by manufacturing and service ﬁrms, 1 there has
*Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ackrishna@ntu.edu.sg (C. Krishnamurti), bizjms@nus.edu.sg (J.M. Sequeira),
fufa@simon.rochester.edu (F. Fangjian).
1 Gompers et al. (2001), in a recent study, ﬁnd a striking relationship between corporate governance and
stock returns. In their paper, they also conclude that ﬁrm value is highly correlated with a ‘‘Governance
Index’’ that they develop.
0378-4266/$ - see front matter  2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/S0378-4266(03)00105-5
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
Journal of Banking & Finance 27 (2003) 1859–1878
Published in Journal of Banking & Finance, Volume 27, Issue 9, September 2003, Pages 1859-1878
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(03)00105-
been little research attention devoted to governance of stock exchanges. A no-
table exception is recent work by Domowitz and Steil (1999), who examine in-
terrelationships between stock exchange automation, governance, and quality of
markets. 2 Traditionally, stock exchanges have been organized as non-proﬁt, mu-
tual/membership associations. A recent trend has been conversion of mutualized
exchanges into publicly owned corporations, which are themselves listed and traded
on a stock exchange. Domowitz and Steil (1999) list several beneﬁts of demutual-
ized as compared to mutualized stock exchanges. The primary driver for such ben-
eﬁts is the favorable governance structure associated with demutualized exchanges.
Domowitz and Steil (1999) argue that members of mutualized stock exchanges
have incentives to oppose innovations even if they increase the exchanges value.
Since traditional stock exchanges are mostly regional monopolies, they could, in
the extreme case, even oppose enhancements to quality of services they provide
if such improvements are thought to diminish the welfare of the respective ex-
change members.
One important implication of the Domowitz and Steil (1999) argument is that
demutualized stock exchanges should provide a better quality market than mutual-
ized ones. For expositional convenience, we refer to this implication as the ‘‘Domo-
witz and Steil Proposition’’. Our papers primary focus is to examine the Domowitz
and Steil Proposition using data from two competing stock exchanges in India,
which diﬀer in their governance structure – namely, the Bombay Stock Exchange
and the National Stock Exchange. Direct comparisons of market quality in the
two stock exchanges are facilitated by the simultaneous trading of at least 40 major
stocks on both exchanges, with both utilizing similar trading systems. While prior
studies have compared the quality of stock markets with diﬀerent trading systems,
reliable comparisons are, in fact, diﬃcult to achieve. 3 There exist two counter-
examples to the proposition that good governance results in market dominance. Ins-
tinet and Tradepoint, despite being organized as for-proﬁt ﬁrms, failed to capture
signiﬁcant market share from the ﬂoor-based NYSE and London Stock Exchange,
respectively. 4 Given evidence suggesting that incumbency places entry barriers to
potential entrants, the importance of stock exchange governance is an empirical
issue.
Our study makes unique contributions to the literature. First, unlike previous
studies to date, using transaction cost as the proxy for market quality, we compare
the quality of two stock exchanges, which are similar in most respects except for their
governance structure. Second, since our study is conducted in an emerging market
2 Other recent papers that examine stock exchange governance include DiNoia (1999) and Bradley
(2002).
3 Prior studies have compared quality of diﬀerent markets by examining measures of liquidity and
execution costs of comparable stocks. In such studies, one cannot be certain that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics are not, in fact, driving the observed results. See, for instance, Aﬄeck-Graves et al.
(1994), Huang and Stoll (1996b), and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997).
4 We wish to thank our discussant, Jim Angel, for pointing out this counterexample.
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setting, it has policy implications for other emerging markets. 5 Third, our paper de-
scribes how advances in trading technology have implications for competition in the
stock market trading industry. In particular, we show the importance of information
technology in breaking down barriers to entry. It is extremely rare for an entrant to
upset an incumbent exchange which makes it worthwhile to study the case of Indian
stock exchanges. Finally, we draw policy implications for regulators who supervise
‘‘natural monopolies’’ such as stock exchanges.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information on
Indian stock markets outlining the principal diﬀerences between the two stock mar-
kets analysed. Section 3 discusses the methodology used in this paper to compute
transaction costs – our proxy for market quality. Section 4 describes the data; empir-
ical results are presented in Section 5. The ﬁnal section contains our conclusions.
2. Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange
2.1. Genesis of the National Stock Exchange
Until the early 1990s, the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) was the premier stock
exchange in India. At that time, BSE was plagued with a variety of problems, prin-
cipal among them, outdated trading and settlement procedures, and poor regard for
investor protection. Gupta (1992) prefaces his book on stock exchange reforms with
the statement ‘‘wide-ranging reforms proposed by oﬃcial study groups have made
no progress because of stiﬀ resistance from powerful lobbies of stock brokers’’.
The recalcitrant attitude of brokers and administration of BSE frustrated eﬀorts
of the regulator, namely, the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), in pushing
through critical reforms to bring the premier exchange of India on par with the best
run exchanges in the world. The complacency of the BSE administration may be at-
tributed to their overestimating the signiﬁcance of barriers to entry in the provision
of stock broking and trading services. BSE also underestimated the determination of
the Government of India to reform the stock markets, who took the unprecedented
step in creating a new stock exchange with the help of government owned and con-
trolled ﬁnancial institutions.
Recent technological advances in communication and computing technologies
aided the eﬀorts of ﬁnancial institutions that spearheaded the establishment of
the new stock exchange. A new stock exchange – the National Stock Exchange
(NSE), emerged as a consequence of the governments eﬀorts and initiatives. The en-
suing competitive market structure in Indian stock markets, as an outcome of the
reform process, is unique and without parallels. NSE dramatically altered the stock
market landscape of the country within a short period of its inception, using current
5 Parisi et al. (2001) compare the Santiago Stock Exchange with the Electronic Stock Exchange to
examine which exchange plays a leadership role. They are, however, unable to examine the eﬀect of
governance on market quality since observed diﬀerences may be attributable either to the variations in
trading systems or diﬀerences in governance.
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best practices in computing and network technology to provide state of the art trad-
ing services to Indian investors. In short, NSE dramatically improved the quality
of trading services and thereby challenged the dominant position held by BSE.
Indian investors were attracted to the high quality of trading services and systems
provided by NSE. In particular, NSEs systems and procedures explicitly incorpo-
rated investor protection. 6 Since BSE clearly lagged behind in service quality, it rap-
idly lost its market share. Fig. 1 clearly depicts the dominance of NSE as measured
by trading volume. To stem erosion of its market share, BSE took steps to improve
its services. NSE, however, retained its ﬁrst-mover advantages due to its early lead
in adopting leading edge technologies and procedures.
Another signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two exchanges pertains to governance.
BSE follows the mutual form of organization whereby stockbrokers own and oper-
ate the exchange. The president of the exchange is elected by broker members and,
therefore, represents their interests; investors interests are consequently relegated to
a secondary position. On the other hand, NSE follows the corporate or demutualized
form of organization, deﬁned as the separation of ownership of the exchange from
membership. According to Domowitz and Steil (1999), incentives of a mutualized ex-
change diﬀer signiﬁcantly from a demutualized one. NSE has incentives to adopt ac-
tions that increase the quality of its market, while BSE is more likely to resist such
changes if they have a deleterious eﬀect on brokerage proﬁts. Thus, we expect the
quality of NSEs market to be higher than that of BSE, ceteris paribus. Hence, mar-
ket quality comparison between NSE and BSE forms the core motivation for our
paper.
2.2. Diﬀerences between NSE and BSE
We begin by outlining the principal diﬀerences between the exchanges. This out-
line allows us to formulate appropriate expectations regarding quality diﬀerences.
We use the following dimensions with which to make these comparisons: ownership,
governance, trading systems, connectivity, and technology use.
2.2.1. Ownership
NSE has been incorporated as a tax paying company and is owned by a group of
large developmental ﬁnancial institutions. On the other hand, BSE is organized as a
brokers association. Broker members own seats on the exchange and operate BSE.
2.2.2. Governance
NSE is professionally managed by a fulltime Managing Director who reports to a
Board of Directors, and is, as such, managed by professionals who do not directly or
indirectly trade on the exchange; ownership and management of the exchange are
6 The Department of Economic Aﬀairs, Government of India, commissioned an expert study in 1991.
The terms of reference included measures to boost investor conﬁdence in the major Indian stock
exchanges. Gupta (1992) documents prevalent wide-spread disenchantment of small investors with the
quality of service provided by major Indian stock exchanges, most notably, the Bombay Stock Exchange.
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therefore, completely separated. Until NSE emerged, most stock exchanges in India
were owned, controlled and managed by brokers who held seats on the various ex-
changes. For the BSE, one of the broker members is elected to administer the ex-
change and is designated as the president of BSE; the president continues to own
a seat on the exchange.
2.2.3. Trading system
NSE uses the latest innovations in computing and network technologies to bring
the best available trading system to its customers, and improves the quality of its
trading system in its bid to attract and retain its customers. A fully automated screen
based trading system, referred to as NEAT and developed by NSE, enables members
from all over the country to trade with one another on a real-time basis with ease and
eﬃciency. NEAT is a completely automated system for order matching that is com-
pletely order driven and provides complete anonymity to its trading members.
NEAT operates on a strict price time priority such that all buy orders received on
the system are sorted with the best-priced order getting the ﬁrst priority for comput-
erized matching with an incoming market sell order. 7 NEAT provides users with
several time related orders such as Good-Till-Cancelled, Good-Till-Day, Immedi-
ate-or-Cancel. Moreover, traders are able to take advantage of price-related and vol-
ume-related orders that may be built into an order.
Fig. 1. Trading volume on BSE and NSE.
7 For instance, within orders that have the same price, time priority is enforced, i.e., orders placed ﬁrst
are executed ﬁrst. This matching process is computerised, keeping the system transparent, objective and
fair. Each order remains in the system until it is matched with an incoming market order or until it is
cancelled, whichever occurs earlier.
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BSE has, however, been slow to adopt new technology. Floor trading was still the
prevalent mode of transacting when NSE commenced operations in November 1994.
Since then, a rapid erosion of market share forced BSE to establish its own comput-
erized trading system. This move was a strategic response to a comparatively supe-
rior trading system established by NSE. By June 1995, BSE inaugurated its own
electronic trading system known as BOLT. BOLT adopted many of the features that
were built into NEAT. NSE is the originator of new initiatives. With BSE usually
responding after a time lag, it appears as if it is merely trying to protect its market
share rather than making a genuine eﬀort to increase customer satisfaction.
2.2.4. Connectivity
NSE established a national network of terminals in over 300 towns and cities in-
cluding those not served by any stock exchange. Network technology using satellite
communications links all member terminals to its main computer located in Bom-
bay. This equal access to traders all over the country sharply contrasts with BSE,
which serves only the city of Bombay. BSE was initially operated as a regional mo-
nopoly with a charter allowing its trading members exclusive rights and access to its
trading ﬂoor in Bombay. Shortly after NSE commenced its trading operations, its
runaway success seemed to threaten the livelihood of BSE brokers. The cost of a seat
on BSE fell from about Rs. 40 million to about Rs. 10 million within a year of NSEs
opening. To counter this, BSE quickly set up BOLT, which started operating from
1995, but was still restricted to the city of Bombay. As the ﬁrst automated exchange
in India, NSE had a freer hand in determining its reach. With no physical trading
ﬂoor limitation, it could logically argue that it is able to cover the entire country.
BSE and all the other regional exchanges in India are regional monopolies, and ac-
cording to their charter, are explicitly prohibited from setting up oﬃces or providing
their services in locations outside their respective jurisdictions. This explicit prohibi-
tion served to limit the connectivity and reach of BSE. NSE is unaﬀected by these
limitations, has enjoyed much network externalities, at a cost to its most powerful
rival, BSE. In this connection, the heavy role of the Indian government in establish-
ing NSE, greatly facilitated its success. 8 Since BSE was not allowed to operate its
terminals outside Bombay until late 1997, NSE had an important advantage. It ap-
pears that BSE and its members learnt a costly lesson that it does not pay to vehe-
mently oppose the regulatory agencies of the Indian government.
2.2.5. Technology
Technology is another dimension on which the two exchanges had completely di-
vergent attitudes. The expert committee report submitted by Mr. M.J. Pherwani to
the government of India in 1991 strongly recommended complete automation in In-
dian stock exchanges. BSE could have taken the cue and set-up its own electronic
exchange. The stance taken by BSE in rejecting a signiﬁcant role for automation
8 We thank our discussant for emphasizing this important factor.
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in its trading seems absolutely incredible. We conjecture that BSEs brokers perhaps
viewed technology as a major threat to their rent seeking activities. 9
In our opinion, technology served to provide two major advantages to NSE in
dealing with he competition from BSE. First, it served to consolidate orders from
various cities in the country which were previously fragmented. The second advan-
tage is the network externality that a completely automated nation-wide network
creates. NSE managed to accomplish large trading volumes within a short period
of its functioning. Scale economies provided by high volume trading activity enabled
NSE to reduce brokerage commissions from about 2% to 0.5%. This reduction in
explicit transaction cost served to break the monopoly of BSE.
2.3. Automation, governance and quality of markets
Although we identify ﬁve major diﬀerences between NSE and BSE, ownership
structure is considered to be the distinguishing characteristic. We argue that it is the
diﬀerence in ownership that determines the characteristics of each exchange. Every-
thing that NSE has achieved since inception, BSE potentially could have accom-
plished in a superior manner. As the premier exchange in India, BSE had access to
resources and the clout to maintain its dominant status. Had BSE adopted NSEs ap-
proach, it would have pre-empted the creation of NSE. BSEs adherence to its status
quo in trading technology most likely stems from vested ﬁnancial interests of its bro-
ker members. The brokers of BSE resisted automation and the attendant improve-
ments in market quality as they perceived that automation would lead to market
transparency. In a transparent system, brokers would be precluded from certain rent-
seeking activities which are deemed illegal. Unlike the automated system, a manual
trading system would not easily detect the illegal activities of these brokers. It is with
these considerations that the ﬂoor trading system continued in spite of alleged ineﬃ-
ciencies. This culture of pleasing the brokers at the cost of investors is very strong inBSE.
The reputation of BSE has often been sullied in the popular press. The following
quote is taken from the editorial column of The Tribune, a newspaper published from
Chandigarh, India in its March 9, 2001 issue:
‘‘Price manipulation is an old sin at the BSE. Harshad Mehta did it. . . . A
shoe exporter jacked up his companys scrip prices. With the active help of
the then BSE president J.C. Parekh, . . . a few operators entered the trading
ﬂoor at the dead of night to doctor the computer data to artiﬁcially in-
crease the prices of BPL, Videocon and Sterlite. He was sacked. . . . There
is a structural ﬂaw in the BSE administration. It is run by brokers who are
not averse to raking in tainted proﬁt by victimising investors. . . . The clear
record of NSE is in sharp contrast to the BSE blots’’.
9 A common complaint that was widely mentioned by traders (before NSE was established) was that
they almost always paid the highest intra-day price on their purchases and received the lowest intra-day
price on their sales. Traders had no way of verifying that the prices that they received (or paid) actually
coincided with transaction prices received by their broker on the ﬂoor. This rent-seeking activity was
largely possible in a ﬂoor-traded environment without signiﬁcant automation.
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According to Domowitz and Steil, ‘‘trading market automation permits demutu-
alization’’, meaning that the corporate structure of organization of a stock exchange
is feasible when computerized trading replaces ﬂoor trading. We illustrate a situation
where causality runs in the reverse direction. NSEs corporate organizational struc-
ture allowed it to pursue trading automation unhindered by potential conﬂicts of
interest with its broker-members. Using professional managers, NSEs primary ob-
jective is value maximization. We conjecture that if NSE adopted the mutual form
of organization, it would have failed to incorporate trading automation since the in-
terests of the broker members would have taken precedence to goals of value max-
imization for the exchange. 10 That NSE did not become the ‘‘second exchange’’ in
Bombay is mainly attributable to its governance as compared to BSE. Unhindered
by brokers participation in the management of the exchange, NSEs managers
had absolute freedom to determine the appropriate trading technology. History
shows that NSE cleverly used technology to exploit the two major weaknesses of
BSE: inherent limitation of ﬂoor-trading and its poor record of investor protection.
NSEs quest for dominance in Indian bourses was greatly advanced by the explicit
support of the Indian government.
Having established the superiority of NSEs governance as compared to BSE,
we next turn to market quality comparisons in order to substantiate the Domowitz
and Steil (1999) proposition.
3. Empirical methods
3.1. Prior literature
A unidimensional quantiﬁcation of market quality is absent in extant literature.
Prior research has focused on liquidity, informational eﬃciency, and volatility char-
acteristics of markets, as the criteria for market quality comparisons. Another view
of market quality is based on transaction costs. In stock markets, transaction costs
may be classiﬁed either as explicit or implicit (execution costs). Execution cost is the
diﬀerence between the actual transaction price and the benchmark price that is con-
sidered to be in some sense, eﬃcient. Unlike commission costs, which are explicit,
execution costs are not directly observed and are not easily measured. Hence, most
prior studies have deﬁned diﬀerent measures of execution costs 11 and compared
10 We have counterexamples in other countries where automation has occurred in mutual structures.
Even if the NSE had pursued trade automation while being governed by a mutual structure, the
incompatibility of brokers interests with value maximization of the exchange would have created
constraints under which the exchange has to operate.
11 Measurement of this diﬀerence between the actual transaction price and the benchmark price is
generally aimed at estimating this ﬁgure for both the buyer and seller engaged in a particular transaction.
This diﬀerence is often calculated as an average transaction cost measure in comparative market analysis,
and is used to determine and evaluate market microstructure studies when transaction costs are minimized
(Huang and Stoll, 1996b; Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997). Such a procedure is applied in this paper.
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these estimates across markets (e.g., Roll, 1984; Berkowitz et al., 1988; Stoll, 1989;
Chan and Lakonishok, 1993; Hasbrouck, 1993).
Several measures of transaction (or execution) cost have been used, principal
among them, are quoted bid–ask spreads and eﬀective bid–ask spreads. In a pure
dealership market, transactions take place only at the quoted bid or the ask price.
Appropriate measures of transaction cost should, therefore, be based on such
quoted/posted bid–ask spreads (see for example, Demsetz, 1968; Branch and Freed,
1977; Benston and Hagerman, 1974; Huang and Stoll, 1996a,b; Barclay et al., 1999).
In many security markets, however, trades frequently take place inside the spread. 12
When this occurs, quoted spreads will tend to overstate investors expected trading
costs, making the eﬀective spread, which is simply the average diﬀerence between
the price at which a dealer sells at one point in time and buys at an earlier point
in time, a better measure for trading costs (e.g., Roll, 1984; Stoll, 1985).
Using two samples of market orders, one based on orders submitted by retail bro-
kers and another submitted electronically to the NYSE, Petersen and Fialkowski
(1994) estimate the spread generated using both orders and report a signiﬁcant dif-
ference between the posted spread and the eﬀective spread paid by investors. Appli-
cations of this eﬀective spread method to measure trading costs have been used in
numerous studies (e.g., Barclay, 1997, 1999; Bessembinder, 1997; Christie and
Huang, 1994; Christie and Schultz, 1994; Huang and Stoll, 1996b).
An alternative approach to measure transaction costs is to calculate the diﬀerence
between the actual transaction price and the eﬃcient price. Broadly deﬁned, the ef-
ﬁcient price, which is considered as the true value of a stock, is an unbiased price es-
timate that can be achieved in any relevant trading period by any randomly selected
trader. Beebower (1989), for example, uses daily high–low midpoint prices and clos-
ing prices as eﬃcient prices, and the eﬀective spread to compute transaction costs.
This measure may, however, place an excessive weight on trades that are not repre-
sentative of most trades over a particular trading period and is, therefore, likely to be
a biased representation of actual transaction prices. To address this, Berkowitz et al.
(1988) propose a measure of transaction costs based on the volume-weighted average
price over the trading day. Although their measure yields results that appear less
biased as compared to other measures that only use single prices, two main problems
may arise: (1) the measure may weight an aberrant trade very heavily, especially
when a very thinly traded stock with small market value experiences a relatively large
transaction; (2) when gaming takes places, that is, traders adjust their trading beha-
vior to aﬀect the ‘‘eﬃcient price’’ when they become aware that they are being eval-
uated on this basis. Another approach introduced in Hasbrouck and Schwartz
(1988) is an overall measure of average execution costs for all trades of a certain
stock, in a particular market, over a certain period of time. This measure relies on
the notion that execution costs increase the volatility of short-term price movements
12 Blume and Goldstein (1992), for example, ﬁnd that between 12% and 31% of the trades occur inside
the spread. Once transactions occur inside the quoted spread, it is often the case that the quoted spread
will tend to overstate the investors expected trading costs and, as such, is not an appropriate measure
of transaction costs.
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relative to the volatility of long-term price movements. Although the measure is an
average value for all trades in a certain market, it is strongly inﬂuenced by the pre-
ponderance of small trades since it was not designed to measure how execution costs
are aﬀected by trading size.
A newer approach developed by Hasbrouck (1993) measures transaction costs in
stock markets based on decomposition of a non-stationary time series into a ran-
dom-walk component and a residual stationary component. When applied to stock
transaction prices, the random-walk component is identiﬁed as the eﬃcient price
with the stationary component (termed the pricing error) representing the diﬀerence
between eﬃcient price and actual transaction price. Dispersion of the pricing error
that results from this division, measures how closely actual transaction prices follow
a random walk and, therefore, constitutes an appropriate measure for transaction
costs.
Hasbrouck proposes the standard deviation of the pricing error, rs, as a summary
measure of market quality that measures how closely the transaction price tracks the
eﬃcient price. This measure of market quality can then be applied to diﬀerent mar-
kets to make appropriate inferences about market quality. The role of rs as a proxy
for market quality depends on the assumption that as transaction costs and other
trading barriers are reduced, actual transaction prices should track the eﬃcient prices
more closely.
4. Data
The dataset used in this study comprises 40 pairs of common stocks that are simul-
taneously listed and traded on both BSE and NSE. All selected stocks are Indian
index stocks that are observed to have large numbers of observations for each trad-
ing day and hence have higher liquidity as compared to other similar stocks. We spe-
ciﬁcally selected these stocks to minimize stock-speciﬁc eﬀects; for example, stocks
with larger market capitalization generally have lower trading costs (see Hasbrouck,
1993). 13 In this paper, the 40 pairs of stocks that are traded on both BSE and NSE
are identical (see Table 1 for a complete listing of the 40 stocks).
In our paper, we apply the Hasbrouck (1993) method to compute the variance of
pricing errors, which is used as the principal metric for market quality comparison.
Since we do not have access to the order book, we were not able to obtain data on
quoted bid and ask prices, and hence, unable to compute quoted or eﬀective spreads.
We also apply the multivariate regression approach of Hasbrouck and Schwartz
(1988) to identify the source of the observed diﬀerences in market quality between
the two exchanges. This approach uses the intuition that ﬁrm-speciﬁc trading char-
acteristics may have an eﬀect on overall market quality.
13 Previous studies, such as Huang and Stoll (1996a,b) and Barclay (1997) that attempt to compare the
transaction costs between the NYSE and NASDAQ, employ stocks that are only matched in a limited
manner, resulting in ﬁndings that tend to be strongly aﬀected by stock-speciﬁc factors.
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High frequency intra-day transaction data are used to compute transaction costs
based on Hasbroucks (1993) approach. All transaction records for the 40 sample
stocks covering the period 1 January 1997 to 31 July 1997 are obtained from NSE
and BSE. This dataset comprises a total of 144 trading days with the total number
of transaction exceeding 15 million. We obtain information on market value, average
weekly/daily price, average trading size, and average number of trades per day, for
Table 1
List of the 40 paired sample stocks traded on both NSE and BSE
Company Name
Asea Brown Boveri Limited
Associated Cement
Andhra Valley Power Supply Co. Limited
Arvind Mills Limited
Ashok Leyland Limited
Asian Paint India Limited
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
BSES
Castrol India Limited
Cochin Reﬁneries Limited
Colgate Palmolive India Limited
East India Hotels Limited
Grasim Industries Limited
Gujarat Ambuja CMT
Housing Development Finance Limited
Hindustan Lever Limited
Hindustan Petroleum
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Limited
Industrial Finance Corporation of India Limited
Indian Hotel Company Limited
Indo Gulf Fertilizers and Chemicals Corp. Limited
Indian Rayon and Industries Limited
ITC
Larsen & Toubro
Mahindra & Mahindra Limited
Mangalore Reﬁnery and Petrochemicals Limited
Mahanagar Tel Nigam Limited
Nestle India Limited
Oriental Bank of Commerce
Ponds India Limited
Ranbaxy Laboratories Limited
Reliance Industries Limited
State Bank of India
Tata Chemicals Limited
Tata Power Co.
Tata Tea
Tata Engr. & Loco.
Thermax Limited
Tata iron & Steel Co.
TVS-Suzuki
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each pair of stocks traded on both exchanges to determine ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors
relevant in transaction cost measurement.
In constructing the time series of returns and trades, we ignore natural time con-
ventions. Instead, we view the data as an untimed sequence of observations, with the
time subscript t incremented each time a new transaction occurs. Overnight returns
are not used to avoid the overnight eﬀects on stock prices. Lee and Readys (1991) ap-
proach is used to infer the direction/sign of a trade by comparing its price to the price
of the preceding trade(s), and is further based on classifying each trade into four cat-
egories: an uptick, a downtick, a zero-uptick, and a zero-downtick. A trade is con-
sidered an uptick (downtick) if the price is higher (lower) than the price of the
previous trade. When the price is at the same level as the previous trade (that is a
zero tick), and when the last price change was an uptick (downtick), then the trade
is considered a zero-uptick (zero-downtick). Essentially, if two successive prices are
the same, the latter one is assumed to follow the sign of the preceding one. A trade is
also classiﬁed as a buy (sell) transaction if it occurs on an uptick (downtick) or a
zero-uptick (zero-downtick). Such an approach is widely used by many studies
and allows us to classify trade directions since quote data are not available. 14
5. Empirical results
In this section, we present the empirical results of transaction costs comparisons
for ‘‘multi-trading’’ stocks that are listed simultaneously on NSE and BSE. We com-
pare both markets on the basis of transaction costs, namely, the standard deviation
of the pricing error, using Hasbroucks (1993) approach. 15
5.1. Standard deviation of the pricing error using Hasbrouck’s (1993) approach
Table 2 lists the computed values of Hasbroucks (1993) measure for all 40 multi-
trading stocks on both markets and the ratio of this measure in NSE relative to its
value for BSE. The smallest standard deviation of the pricing error is 0.0152 and
0.0934 for NSE and BSE, respectively; the largest values are 0.8639 and 1.4901 for
NSE and BSE, respectively.
The standard deviation of pricing error represents the percent value of transaction
costs for a particular stock. Clearly, both minimum and maximum values of Has-
broucks measure are greater on BSE. Moreover, the mean standard deviation of
the pricing error is 0.27% and 0.64% of stock prices on NSE and BSE, respectively.
The mean ratio (NSE/BSE) of 0.4034 conﬁrms that the average transaction cost of
these multi-trading stocks on NSE is lower than BSE. Hasbroucks (1993) results
14 Holthausen et al. (1987) also use a tick rule in their study.
15 In an earlier version of the paper, we also included estimated spreads using the approach of Roll
(1984). Since the estimates obtained with daily data were extremely noisy, we have discarded these results
for the sake of brevity. These results also show conclusively that NSE has lower transaction costs as
compared to BSE.
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of 0.33% of stock prices on the NYSE are closer to NSEs average ﬁgure of 0.27%
while BSE reports average values of 0.64%.
A Wilcoxon signed ranks test is used to compare the mean standard deviation of
the pricing error for these multi-trading stocks to determine whether there is signif-
icant diﬀerence in Hasbroucks (1993) measure between the two markets. The test
Table 2
Hasbroucks (1993) measure for paired sample stocks in NSE and BSE
Stocks BSE (%) NSE (%) Ratio (NSE/BSE)
Andhra Valley Pwr. 0.4370 0.1716 0.3927
Arvind Mills 0.5458 0.1248 0.2287
Asea Brown Boveri 1.3727 0.5550 0.4043
Ashok Leyland 0.9676 0.1819 0.1880
Asian Paints 0.9762 0.3578 0.3665
Associated Cement 0.8645 0.4310 0.4986
Bharat Heavy Els. 0.3483 0.2159 0.6199
BSES 0.3980 0.0972 0.2442
Castrol India 0.6287 0.2379 0.3784
Cochin Reﬁneries 0.2894 0.1852 0.6399
Colgate-Palmolive 0.5111 0.1529 0.2992
EIH 1.4901 0.6690 0.4490
Grasim Inds. 1.3783 0.3778 0.2741
Gujarat Ambuja CMT 0.4223 0.1429 0.3384
Hdfc Bank 0.8448 0.8639 1.0226
Hindustan Lever 0.9546 0.4183 0.4382
Hindustan Ptl. Corp. 0.4831 0.3289 0.6808
ICICI 0.3896 0.0750 0.1925
IFCI Ltd. 0.0934 0.0152 0.1627
Indian Hotels Co. 1.1899 0.7472 0.6280
Indian Rayon & Inds. 1.0697 0.3229 0.3019
Indogulf Fert. 0.1174 0.0771 0.6567
ITC 0.4136 0.1086 0.2628
Larsen & Toubro 0.3786 0.0904 0.2388
Mahanagar Tel Nigam 0.2705 0.1101 0.4070
Mahindra & Mahindra 1.0382 0.3837 0.3699
MRPL 0.0955 0.0350 0.3665
Nestle India 0.8387 0.2679 0.3194
Oriental Bk. of Com. 0.1226 0.0513 0.4184
Ponds 0.7593 0.8611 1.1341
Ranbaxy Labs. 1.1797 0.4189 0.3551
Tata Chemicals 0.6699 0.1664 0.2484
Tata Engr. & Loco. 0.4220 0.1184 0.2806
Tata Iron & Steel 0.4020 0.0625 0.1555
Tata Power Co. 0.2988 0.0792 0.2651
Tata Tea Co. 0.5675 0.1666 0.2936
Thermax 0.5792 0.3842 0.6633
TVS-Suzuki 0.9522 0.6084 0.6389
Reliance Inds. 0.4919 0.0751 0.1527
State Bank of Ida. 0.3804 0.0617 0.1622
Mean 0.6400 0.2700 0.4034
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statistic is highly signiﬁcant at the 1% level with a value of )5.417, strongly support-
ing our hypothesis that the average standard deviation for the pricing error for
multi-trading stocks on NSE is signiﬁcantly lower for identical set of stocks traded
on BSE. Since the standard deviation of the pricing errors is used as a measure for
transaction costs, results suggest average trading costs on NSE are signiﬁcantly lower
than BSE.
We have shown that NSE is a better quality market than BSE, a ﬁnding consistent
with the Domowitz and Steil (1999) proposition. Can we attribute observed diﬀer-
ences in the quality of market to the diﬀerence in governance in structure? Outlined
below are possible structural explanations of ﬁndings.
5.2. Why is the quality of market better on NSE?
Although transaction costs on NSE are lower than BSE, market structure diﬀer-
ences may account for these results.
Table 3 summarizes the main structural diﬀerences between the two exchanges
which enable NSE to operate with lower transaction costs, and led to NSEs domi-
nation of BSE. The factors shown in italics are related to ownership/governance.
Following Domowitz and Steil (1999), we argue that a demutualized ownership
structure has enabled NSE to score higher on these governance variables: use of tech-
nology, internal control systems, transparency, regulation and investor protection.
Small and medium investors would be attracted to NSE due to the perceived better
quality of governance and protection. In addition, the geographical reach, which is
not a governance factor, is likely to augment trading activity on NSE, and therefore
have a beneﬁcial eﬀect on execution costs.
While factors such as technology use and investor protection serve to enhance
market quality by attracting liquidity traders, it is not obvious that a more transpar-
ent market with better internal control systems, transparency and regulation will en-
hance the quality of market as measured by execution costs (transaction costs). A
market with fewer regulations and weak internal control systems would be attractive
to traders who seek to exploit inside information. Such a market would be attractive
to institutional traders if the exchange were negligent in enforcing regulations. In fact
Table 3
A comparison of the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange
Factors BSE NSE
Geographic reach Mainly limited to Bombay city Across the whole of India
Ownership structure Brokers association Organized as a company
Use of technology Laggard and follower Pioneer in computerized trading
Internal system control Insider trading and market
manipulation are rampant
Stickler for market integrity
Transparency Relatively secretive Follows an open policy
Regulation Resists regulatory change Self-regulated; better risk
management systems
Investor protection Low standards High standards
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BSE would be more attractive to insiders and institutional traders on account of the
perceived laxity of that exchange. Such a market can theoretically provide lower
execution costs if some traders place limit orders of large sizes.
Based on a comparison of the two exchanges, we expect NSE to have a higher de-
gree of trading activity (number of trades) and BSE to have a larger trade size. Both
these factors are expected to result in an improvement in market quality via a reduc-
tion in execution costs. Some governance factors for which we have no proxies, tech-
nology use and investor protection, may have an inﬂuence on market quality. To
disaggregate the source of market quality diﬀerences a multivariate study is con-
ducted.
5.3. Multivariate analysis using Hasbrouck and Schwartz’s (1988) method
Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) compare execution costs across diﬀerent markets
by using a multivariate approach. We use a variation of their model to examine the
eﬀect of governance and other factors on trading costs. The multivariate regression
model is used to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that have a bearing on execution
costs. Explanatory variables include average price (AP), average size per trade
(AST), average number of trades per day (ATD), and market value (MV) for a par-
ticular stock over the sample period. AST is used to account for the occurrence of
block trades of a particular stock while ATD is a proxy for the liquidity of the stock
on a particular exchange. We expect that ATD would be higher on NSE as com-
pared to BSE while the AST of BSE is expected to be larger. Price and market cap-
italization are used as control variables following the work of Hasbrouck and
Schwartz (1988).
Transaction costs are regressed against a set of variables, which include the stocks
price, liquidity, market value, according to the following equation:
Ci ¼ a0 þ a1APi þ a2ASTi þ a3ATDi þ a4MVi þ a5Di þ ei; ð1Þ
where Ci represents the transaction costs for stock i, deﬁned as the standard devi-
ation of the pricing errors; other variables are deﬁned above except for Di, which is a
dummy variable to distinguish between the two markets and set equal to one for
NSE stocks and zero for BSE stocks. The dummy variable is included to capture
potential governance factors.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics pertaining to AP, AST and ATD on both
exchanges. The average stock price of 546.46 rupees is higher on BSE as compared
to 467.11 rupees on NSE. Stocks traded on NSE have a smaller mean AST, suggest-
ing larger trades on BSE as compared to NSE primarily due to frequent insider trad-
ing and institutional block trading on BSE. Wilcoxon and t-test statistics for the
diﬀerence in AST between these two markets are signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The mean value of 2299 daily trades on NSE is larger than the 1196 recorded for
BSE and the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant using both the Wilcoxon and the
standard t-test. As the average trade per day is often used as a proxy for the liquidity
of stocks, this result is indicative of higher liquidity of NSE as compared to BSE. The
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increased trading activity is possibly a consequence of the nation-wide network
established by NSE as compared to a city-wide network employed by BSE.
A total of ﬁfteen regressions are estimated based on all possible combinations of
the independent variables in our study. 16 Selected results of these regressions are
presented in the Table 5. Values of the adjusted R2 range from 0.278 to 0.403. The
dummy variable, Di, is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all regressions, suggest-
ing that transaction costs on NSE are lower than BSE even after controlling for trad-
ing activity, trade size and the control variables.
Estimates of the average price are positively related to transaction costs in all re-
gressions and signiﬁcant in regressions 4 and 5. The statistical signiﬁcance wanes as
Table 4
Descriptive statistics of independent variables in multivariate regressions
BSE NSE
Number of sample stocks 40 40
Average price (AP)a
Minimumb 20.09 23.46
Maximumc 4357.03 3705.17
Mean 546.46 467.11
Average size per trade (AST)d
Minimum 29 22
Maximum 903 545
Mean 363 259
Wilcoxon teste )4.396 (0.000)
t-test )4.215 (0.000)
Average number of daily trades (ATD)f
Minimum 12 46
Maximum 7802 19451
Mean 1196 2299
Wilcoxon testg 4.241 (0.000)
t-test 2.143 (0.038)
Notes:
a AP is the average price over the sample period.
b The stock ‘‘HDFC Bank’’ has the highest average price over the sample period on both the NSE and
BSE.
c The stock ‘‘MRPL’’ has the lowest average price over the sample period on both NSE and BSE.
dAST is the average size per trade over the sample period.
e From the Wilcoxon ranks test for AST, we obtain 7 positive ranks, 1 tie and 32 negative ranks;
t-statistics are based on positive ranks.
f ATD is the average number of trades per day computed as the total number of trades/total number of
days over the sample period.
g From the Wilcoxon signed ranks test for ATD, we obtain 36 positive ranks and 4 negative ranks;
t-statistics value are based on positive ranks.
* Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (p-values in parenthesis).
16 This procedure is valid when the number of regressors is small since the total number of regressions
is a function of ½2 expðkÞ  1, where k represents the number of regressors (see Maddala, 1977).
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other trading activity and market value variables are included. 17 A negative relation
is observed between the average size per trade and transaction costs, implying that
larger trade size lowers transaction costs. This negative relation is signiﬁcant in re-
gressions 3 and 6. The number of trades per day is signiﬁcant and negatively related
to transaction costs in regressions 4 and 7. The signiﬁcance drops when the AST
variable is included (correlation between ATD and AST is 0.23). As expected, stocks
that trade actively tend to be associated with lower transaction costs. Also, since
ATD is a proxy for liquidity, higher liquidity results in lower transaction costs.
The market capitalization (MV) of stocks is negatively related to transaction costs
indicating that stocks with larger market value generally exhibit lower transaction
costs, a result consistent with that obtained in Roll (1984) and Hasbrouck (1993).
In all cases, the dummy variable is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. We cau-
tiously interpret this ﬁnding to indicate that the residual impact of superior gover-
nance in the NSE results in a lower transaction cost as compared to BSE.
These results are consistent with Krishnamurti and Lim (1999), who ﬁnd that
NSE, with lower execution costs, lower price volatility, and higher liquidity, is a
better-quality market than BSE. It is, therefore, not surprising to observe that
NSE has taken over much of the transaction volume from BSE since its inception.
This dominance is clearly demonstrated in Fig. 1 over the period April 1996 until
January 1998, which shows NSE with a consistently higher trading volume as com-
pared to BSE since its inception.
Table 5
Regressions with transaction cost as dependent variable
Equa-
tion
Constant AP AST ATD MV Dummy R2
1 0.800 6.548E)5 )4.573E)4 )1.373E)5 )1.376E)7 )0.404 0.402
(1.650) ()1.947) ()1.149) ()0.218) ()5.493)
2 0.773 6.995E)5 )4.303E)4 )1.190E)5 )0.397 0.403
(1.810) ()1.917) ()1.220) ()5.592)
3 0.871 )6.055E)4 )8.965E)6 )0.424 0.377
()2.946) ()0.919) ()6.021)
4 0.608 1.019E)4 )1.934E)5 )0.341 0.373
(2.873) ()2.125) ()5.178)
5 0.585 1.024E)4 )0.363 0.336
(2.823) ()5.443)
6 0.886 )6.748E)4 )0.441 0.370
()3.533) ()6.501)
7 0.664 )1.951E)5 )0.349 0.305
()2.049) ()5.069)
8 0.686 )6.742E)7 )0.374 0.278
()1.085) ()5.188)
Notes: The dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 for all NSE stocks and 0 for BSE stocks; t-statistics are
given in parentheses.
*Denotes signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
17 The correlation between AP and MV is 0.39, while AP has a negative correlation of )0.28 with the
AST variable.
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6. Conclusion
The primary role of a stock exchange is to provide trading services to its ultimate
clients. Prior studies have concentrated on comparing the quality of markets with
diﬀerent trading systems. Little attention has been paid to the critical issue of the
quality of markets and stock exchange governance. A recent trend has been in the
demutualization of stock exchanges, ostensibly, to better deal with emerging compe-
tition from electronic trading networks. In a recent paper, Domowitz and Steil
(1999) provide convincing arguments in favor of demutualized exchanges. They rea-
son that members of a mutualized exchange have incentives to oppose innovation
that increase the quality of its services, and hence the value of the exchange, while
stakeholders of a demutualized exchange, are likely to favor any measure that en-
hances the value of the ﬁrm.
We examine the Domowitz and Steil proposition using data from a large emerging
market, namely, India, which has two major exchanges with distinguishably diﬀerent
organizational structures. The National Stock Exchange uses a demutualized form
of organization unlike the Bombay Stock Exchange, which continues to pursue
the mutual structure. Consistent with the Domowitz and Steil proposition, we ﬁnd
that National Stock Exchange has a better quality market as compared to Bombay
Stock Exchange based on the market quality measure derived by Hasbrouck (1993).
Multivariate regression results indicate that superior governance of NSE is at least
partially responsible for its better market quality. Better governance, incorporation
of the latest technology, and governmental support, are major factors that jointly
contributed to NSEs superior market quality as compared to BSE.
This study has implications for emerging markets where regulators do not have
suﬃcient experience or inﬂuence in dealing with recalcitrant monopolists. Competi-
tion has been shown to be more eﬀective than regulatory dictates in transforming be-
haviour of members on the Bombay Stock Exchange. Economic incentives are likely
to be more potent in transforming rent seeking behavior than directives from policy
regulators.
The role played by technology in transforming Indian stock markets is particularly
evident. Applying the latest technology, the National Stock Exchange was able to
penetrate barriers to entry in the stock-broking industry, which had the consequent
beneﬁt of reducing the cost of providing these services. Being able to pass on lower
trading costs to investors, the National Stock Exchange posed a serious threat to the
existence of the oldest exchange in India, namely the Bombay Stock Exchange. That
technology is responsible for breaking barriers to entry and for dramatically improv-
ing quality of markets in Indian stock exchanges is unequivocal.
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